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Abstract
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been rigorously examined by scholars of international business. While
recent studies have achieved a general consensus with regard to the political and economic determinants of
FDI inflows and outflows, this paper sought to reconcile two disparate segments of the literature – regime
type and political climate – based upon recently available events data. The study ultimately failed to establish
support for its hypothesis that bilateral political ties can substantively mitigate political risk to investment in
states with autocratic regimes, but demonstrates a necessity to look beyond country-level political risk factors
and further examine those of the dyad in making foreign investment decisions.
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been rigorously examined by scholars of 
international business.  While recent studies have achieved a general consensus with 
regard to the political and economic determinants of FDI inflows and outflows, this 
paper sought to reconcile two disparate segments of the literature – regime type and 
political climate – based upon recently available events data.  The study ultimately 
failed to establish support for its hypothesis that bilateral political ties can substantively 
mitigate political risk to investment in states with autocratic regimes, but demonstrates 
a necessity to look beyond country-level political risk factors and further examine those 
of the dyad in making foreign investment decisions.  
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Introduction: 
 
In this era of economic globalism, scholars of international business have sought to 
address a salient question: are the interests of multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
conflictual with those of democratic governance?  In recent literature on the non-market 
determinants of FDI, this question has been approached by examining levels of 
investment in countries with either democratic or autocratic regimes.  It has been shown 
that the benefits of transparency and accountability for investments found in states with 
democratic regimes far outweigh the benefits of low wages and exploitative contracts 
that MNEs can reap by investing in states with autocratic regimes.  However, this 
general consensus is vulnerable to the criticism that recent studies have examined only 
country-level political risk factors and, as such, upheld a dichotomous view of 
democracy and autocracy that does not reflect the range of political risk as it relates to 
multinational investor preference.  By including a larger sample of home countries than 
in recent literature and introducing measures for bilateral political risk to existing 
models of FDI, this paper seeks to improve the generalizability of relationships 
established in prior studies, uncover the determinants of FDI that may exist at the 
dyadic level of analysis, and further examine the consensus that the interests of MNEs 
are complementary with those of democratic governance. 
This paper begins in the Background section with a definition of FDI and brief 
discussion of its importance and theory.  A section for Literature follows, in which the 
methodology and objective of recent studies are summarized.  In the Extension, this 
study is positioned in the existing literature and its principal hypotheses are outlined.  
The paper then describes the Methodology and Data that was adopted to test the 
hypotheses, makes Predictions in accordance with intuition and recent studies, and 
presents its Results.  The potential Flaws are then discussed, followed by a Conclusion, 
which offers a suggestion for further research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
Background and Definitions: 
 
FDI describes the investment of privately owned capital from an MNE to operations in 
a foreign country.  To qualify as FDI, an investment must give the MNE some degree of 
control over operations abroad.  FDI has been widely studied because of its implications 
for the world economy.  According to Nathan Jensen, “FDI is an engine of employment, 
technological progress, productivity improvements, and ultimately economic growth” 
(Jensen 2003, 587).  As such, generating inflows of FDI is considered to be a crucial 
element of economic development (Jensen 2003, 587-588).   
Dunning’s Eclectic Theory of FDI is the commonly accepted paradigm for 
decomposing the advantages that FDI confers upon firms – ownership, location, and 
internalization.  With regard to ownership, engaging in FDI projects allows MNEs to 
leverage the distinct competencies of their business practices – whether operational, 
intellectual, or brand superiority – to outperform competitors in the host market and 
generate returns in excess of what is possible at home.  The advantage of location refers 
to the ability of MNEs to supply a foreign market through production in the host 
country, rather than exports to it.  This allows the sale of goods that, due to trade 
barriers or large physical characteristics, may be otherwise unprofitable.  Along similar 
lines, FDI also benefits MNEs if an abundance of natural resources in the host country 
reduces input prices, or if a highly educated workforce can produce quality goods.  
Finally, the advantage of internalization refers to the extension of well-established 
corporate oversight and hierarchical structures to a foreign market that may be poorly 
developed.  This describes why MNEs may choose to engage in FDI, as opposed to 
simply licensing production to a firm in the host country (Jensen 2003, 591).  These 
advantages allow MNEs to overcome the liability of being foreign and succeed in 
markets outside of their home. 
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Literature: 
 
Scholars have demonstrated the extent to which geographic, economic, and 
demographic features of a host country – market and cost based elements of Dunning’s 
advantage of location – can attract inflows of FDI.  Geographic features, such as an 
abundance of natural resources in the host country, can decrease input prices and thus 
increase the profitability of operations abroad.  Economic factors also have a great deal 
of explanatory power.  For instance, market size is an indicator for an economy’s ability 
to absorb large amounts of FDI, and market growth is often directly correlated with 
returns to investment.  Finally, the demographic features of a host country can promote 
inflows of FDI.  Human capital of a workforce (operationalized as average schooling, 
literacy, etc.) is one such example.   
With regard to the non-market determinants of FDI, regime type studies have 
examined the extent to which U.S. MNEs prefer to invest in states with autocratic 
regimes.  Alternatively, scholars focusing on political climate have attributed flows of 
FDI to international and intranational cooperation and conflict.  Each has sought to 
uncover the preferences of international investors as they relate to political risk to 
investment. 
The previously untested assumption in the regime type literature is that MNEs 
prefer to invest in peripheral countries, as their market power is relatively greater in 
emerging markets and can be leveraged to gain unduly favorable terms for business 
(Oneal, 568).  Furthermore, it is assumed that MNEs prefer to invest in states with 
autocratic regimes, whose repression of unions and collective bargaining ensures low 
wages, and whose popular suppression allows the formation of exploitative contracts 
(Jensen, 593).  This conjecture raises a salient question in this era of economic 
globalism: are the interests of MNEs conflictual with those of democratic governance? 
The consensus in recent studies is that the above assumptions are false.  Much to 
the vindication of capitalists worldwide, the exact opposite seems to be true – MNEs 
prefer to invest in countries whose governance is transparent, liberal, and democratic.  
John Oneal was among the first to approach this subject quantitatively.  In his paper, 
The Affinity of Foreign Investors for Authoritarian Regimes, Oneal examined both the 
flow and profitability of non-petroleum FDI to 22 developed countries and 26 less 
developed countries (LDCs).  Controlling for financial risk, business cycles, GDP 
 5
growth, and military vs. civilian government, Oneal regressed FDI data from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (1950-1985) against an indicator for regime type.  The study 
operationalized regime type, autocracy vs. democracy, on -10 to +10 point scale using 
weights ranging from “competitiveness of political participation” to “constraints on 
chief executive” (Oneal, 573). 
Oneal’s findings lend some support to the traditional assumption that U.S. 
MNEs have performed best in autocratic states.  When considering only LDCs, a one 
point increase in a regime’s autocracy score increases profits by an average of 0.17 
percent.1  It was also observed that, in the periphery, FDI flow was greater to autocratic 
than democratic states.2  A regional-level examination of these findings has yielded 
mixed results.  When considering all countries, however, higher returns on FDI were 
observed in developed democracies than in countries with autocratic regimes (though 
results of FDI flow vis-à-vis regime type were insignificant).   
More recently, Jensen sought to explicitly overturn the traditional assumption 
through his study, Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political 
Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment.  Jensen hypothesized that MNEs 
prefer to invest in states with democratic regimes (as opposed to autocratic ones) 
because they confer less political risk to investments.  Indeed, democratic governance 
enhances cooperation between other states and corporations.  More importantly, 
however, democratic regimes are ultimately responsible to an electorate and, as such, 
can make more credible commitments to not expropriate investments, nationalize 
industry, or renegotiate contracts (Jensen, 594).   
Jensen regressed net inflow FDI data from the World Bank against an indicator 
for regime type similar to that which was used by Oneal.  Improving upon previous 
designs, however, Jensen included controls for natural resources and government 
consumption levels.  The results contradict Oneal’s with regard to his subsidiary 
conclusion – that, ceteris paribus, MNEs prefer autocratic regimes when considering 
only LDCs. Indeed, Jensen found that the MNE preference for democracy holds even 
when considering only non-OECD countries.  Jensen also concluded that democracy is 
inversely correlated with sovereign default risk. 
                                                
1 result only slightly significant: p < .10 
2 result statistically insignificant 
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With regard to the political climate literature, most studies have concluded that 
the perception of political environment in a host country is one of the primary non-
market determinants of FDI (Schollhammer and Nigh, 21).  Nigh’s 1985 article, The 
Effect of Political Events on United States Direct Foreign Investment: A Pooled Time-
Series Cross-Sectional Analysis, examined the relationship between manufacturing FDI 
and political climate across 21 years and 24 countries.  As an indicator for both 
international and intranational cooperation and conflict, the study used Azar’s Conflict 
and Peace Database (COPDAB).  Control variable used in the regression included 
market size, market growth, and others.  On the basis of this data, Nigh concluded that 
both international and intranational conflict and cooperation have a significant effect on 
U.S. FDI to developing countries, whereas only international conflict and cooperation 
affects U.S. FDI to the developed world. 
Building upon this study, Tallman later examined the extent to which home 
country political climate affects outflows of FDI – in other words, the factors lead 
MNEs to seek investment opportunities abroad.  The methodology is similar to Nigh’s 
study, in which the COPDAB was used as an indicator for political climate and GDP 
was controlled for.  Results indicated a positive relationship between adverse political 
conditions and the outflow of FDI from industrialized countries to the United States. 
These findings are approximately consistent with the more recent literature.  
Biglaiser and DeRouen, for example, examined the effect of regime type on U.S. 
outbound FDI from 1965 to 2002 (Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2005).  Their study included 
controls for host country macroeconomics, governance, economic reforms, and U.S. 
military presence, as well as lagged measures for natural resources, FDI, per capita 
GDP, and both internal and external conflict (operationalized in Marshall’s ‘Societal 
Effects of Warfare’ data, 2002).  In this study, Biglaiser and DeRouen find that regime 
type, though significant, has less an impact on U.S. outbound FDI (when political 
stability is controlled for) than other variables in the study, such as market size and 
governance.  They also find that the effect of U.S. troops in a host country has a positive 
and significant effect on flows of FDI. 
In a similar study, Busse and Hefeker examined FDI data (1984–2003) to 83 
developing countries (Busse and Hefeker, 2005).  Their study used the PRS Group’s 
International Country Risk Guide for its measures of political risk.  Controls were 
added for Gross National Income per capita and its growth rate, trade as a percentage of 
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GDP, and inflation.  On the whole, Busse and Hefeker find support for their measures 
of political risk as they relate to inflows of FDI, with government stability and quality 
of bureaucracy being amongst the most significant of the PRS Group’s country-level 
measures. 
 
Extension: 
 
The basic approach of this study is to introduce an indicator for the affect and density of 
bilateral political ties to existing models of FDI.  With few exceptions, FDI research has 
been conducted at the country level of analysis and examined inflows or outflows to a 
single home or host.  This has limited the extent to which the determinants of FDI flows 
can be generalized across time and space.  As such, introducing a set of dyadic 
explanatory variables into a fully cross-sectional model is an important next step in the 
research on FDI.   
 Dyadic measures provide a far more realistic context for evaluating political risk 
than country-level variables, which are limited to using a weighted average of bilateral 
relations for each host.  Also, framing the data within dyads allows us to evaluate 
country specific determinants for both the home and host together.  In addition, this 
study includes a full cross section of OECD home countries, instead of limiting the data 
to inflows from the United States.  This allows us to examine the generalizability of 
relationships for which support has been found in previous studies.  For example, do 
investors in all countries view the political risk associated with democratic and 
autocratic political structures in the same way? 
It is important to recognize that political risk varies not just by regime and 
country but also by dyad.  For instance, consider the United States’ post-9/11 
relationship with Pakistan.  One would expect inflows of FDI to the country to increase 
as Pakistan becomes a strategic ally in the War on Terror – despite no macroeconomic 
or regime changes in the country.  Alternatively, consider the possibility for greater FDI 
inflows from the United States to Indonesia during times of U.S. military presence in 
Southeast Asia.  Indeed, it is likely that the dichotomy between democracy and 
autocracy in existing studies is overly simplistic.  Investors desire protection for their 
investments, and there is potential for this to be achieved either through investing in 
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democratic and transparent states, or through investing in autocratic states with clear 
ties to the home country. 
Using events-data, this paper examines the extent to which MNEs prefer to invest in 
states with autocratic regimes whose national interests are aligned with those of the 
home country.  This scenario is intuitively sound, as there is potential for MNEs to reap 
the benefits of low wages and preferential treatment associated with autocratic regimes, 
while at the same time mitigate the political risk that typically pushes FDI toward 
developed democracies.  Pursuant to this intuition, this paper empirically tests the 
following two hypotheses: 
 
H1: Bilateral affect and political ties are positive determinants of FDI flows 
within and between dyads. 
 
H2: The relative importance of this relationship depends upon the nature of 
political structures in the host country; ceteris paribus, bilateral affect and 
political ties have a greater influence on inflows to autocratic states. 
 
Methodology and Data: 
 
Unlike past studies, which have examined FDI inflows or outflows to a single 
home or host country, the dependent variable in this research is FDI inflows and net 
flows3 from the nearly 30 member nations of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to 61 host countries over a period of ten years 
(1991–2000).4  Capital flows within each of the 1,712 dyads were aggregated into a 
common currency using market exchange rates.  Ideally, the chosen aggregation metric 
should have accounted for the relative price difference between host countries; 
however, the only widely available statistical construct – Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) – is based upon baskets of consumer goods and is thus an inappropriate proxy for 
the input prices of industrial production.  
Inflows of FDI within a dyad refer to transfers of investment dollars from a 
home to host country.  For example, when U.S. MNEs contribute money to investment 
                                                
3 Calculated as outflows minus inflows 
4 See Appendix A 
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projects in China, a positive inflow within the U.S. – China dyad is registered in the 
data.  Some of the greatest inflows in the data were observed between the U.S. and 
United Kingdom.  Net flows of FDI refer to outflows minus inflows within a given 
dyad; in other words, the amount of investment dollars that flow from the host to the 
home, minus those that flow in the opposite direction.  As such, one might expect 
negative net flows between the United States and a smaller (though lucrative) economy 
(U.S. – France, 1990), or positive net flows if the United States were to be defined as 
the host country in that same scenario (United Kingdom – U.S., late 1990s)   
Negative net flows would also be observed if the host country in a given dyad 
were disproportionately more attractive or hospitable to foreign investors than the home 
(Japan – U.S., late 1990s).   Alternatively, high net flows could be interpreted to show 
capital flight from loss of investor confidence.  For example, during times of political 
instability in Country A, U.S. investors may choose to decrease inflows of foreign 
investment to that country, while investors in Country A maintain confidence (and 
outflows of investment) to the United States.  In the data, some of the highest net flows 
are found between the United States and Brazil in 1990, and between Belgium and 
Brazil during that same year.  This was likely the result of Brazil’s economic instability, 
which contributed to large negative inflows to Brazil from those countries.   
The first group of independent variables in this study was constructed using 
events-data from the Virtual Research Associates (VRA).  The VRA’s Reader parses 
text from the headings of Reuters news articles and codes them according to 195 event 
categories, ranging from apologies to military seizures.  The process is fully automatic 
and accurate to a degree consistent with that of undergraduate coders (King and Lowe 
2001, 14).  This study used VRA’s codes for 3.7 million international dyadic events, 
involving 201 countries for the years 1991-2000.  In essence, the data provides a 
quantitative summary of the who/what/when/and where of 3.7 million events.  Instead 
of broadly categorizing dyadic conflict and cooperation based on limited weighting 
schemes and surveys, events-data analysis allows an appraisal to be made that is 
exhaustive of public discourse worldwide.  Given that the perception of political 
climate largely drives the risk-factored investment decisions of MNEs, VRA provides 
what is perhaps the ideal metric for examining the relationship between FDI and dyadic 
political climate. 
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In order to contextualize the 3.7 million VRA events, a normative weighting 
scheme for cooperation and conflict was introduced to the data.  For the purposes of this 
study, the Goldstein Scale (GS) was chosen because of its wide use in the International 
Relations literature.  The GS uses a [-10, +10] point range to denote gradations of 
cooperation and conflict at both the state and dyadic levels of analysis.  The weights, in 
conjunction with the VRA events, could be used to approximate positive/negative affect 
(accept/deny, praise/denounce, etc.), political ties (improve/break relations, ease/tighten 
sanctions, etc.), and dependency (requests for/promises of military, economic, and 
humanitarian aid).  To put a few event categories in context of the weighting scheme, 
military engagements, occupations, and coups receive a negative 10, whereas promises 
of military, economic, and humanitarian aid lie at the other end of the spectrum.  Events 
receiving a zero (or neutral) score, include sports contests, arts & entertainment 
performances, etc.   
Using the GS as a weighting scheme, the sum and count of VRA events were 
computed for every dyad-year: 
 
Χ Dyad-year (VRA, GS) 
 
This study aggregated scores for home source and home target (that is, when the home 
is the source and target, respectively, of action within a dyad).  Normal quantile plots 
revealed that the count measure was skewed heavily to the right and, as such, the 
variable was logged.  Ultimately, for every dyad-year, there were two different one-
value summaries of bilateral affect and political ties: 
 
VRA-G Sum = Home Source Sum + Home Target Sum 
VRA-G Count = Log [Home Source Count + Home Target Count] 
 
By way of example, in 1998 the France–Brazil Home Source/Target Count was 46; in 
other words, the actions committed by France to Brazil in 1998, and vice-versa, 
registered as 46 unique Goldstein-relevant events in the popular press. 
The VRA-Goldstein Count variable was formulated to measure the density of 
bilateral relations.  To provide some examples from the data, the highest VRA-
Goldstein Count observed was between the U.S. – United Kingdom in 1999.  In that 
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dyad-year, 1,853 unique Goldstein-relevant events were captured by VRA’s data.  Other 
high Counts during the 1990s include Japan – U.S. (1677), Canada – U.S. (898), U.S. – 
China (831), and U.K. – China (853).  Some of the lowest Counts in the data set include 
dyads such as Poland – Bulgaria and Finland – Canada. 
The VRA-Goldstein Sum variable was formulated to measure both the density 
and affect of bilateral relations.  Not surprisingly, many of the lowest Sums observed in 
the data are between countries with bitter histories of conflict.  For example, the most 
negative Sum (-451) was found between France and Algeria in 1997.  Incidentally, the 
vast majority of that score (97%) is comprised of events in which France was the source 
of action.  Other large negative Sums are observed within dyads such as Turkey – 
Germany, U.S. – Iran, and Australia – Indonesia.  At the other end of the spectrum lie 
dyads such as U.S. – China, Japan – U.S., and U.S – United Kingdom, which have some 
of the highest Sums in the data. 
Consistent with the design of existing research on the non-market determinants 
of FDI, this study also included a number of control variables.  The first of these was 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, aggregated into a common currency using 
PPP and logged to correct for a skewed distribution.  This measure, in conjunction with 
Population, is a commonly accepted proxy for market size and an economy’s ability to 
absorb FDI (Jensen).  A measure for Human Capital (operationalized in this study as a 
country’s illiteracy rate) was also included.  Other authors, such as Jensen, have used 
Average Schooling of Workforce in this instance, but unfortunately the coverage of that 
data was prohibitively sparse for the country and time sample of this study.  The next 
control variable was Inflation Rate.  According to Philipp Harms and others, this 
variable can be used as a proxy for a country’s macroeconomic management – 
something that is no doubt of interest to international investors (Harms 2001, 6).  As 
was mentioned previously, an abundance of natural resources can increase the 
profitability of FDI in a given host country; as such, a measure for Primary Exports was 
also included – operationalized as % of total exports, Σ Dyad-year (food, fuel, agriculture, 
mines/ores).  Finally, a measure for Economic Openness (operationalized as trade 
volume as % of GDP) was used as a proxy for FDI inflow controls, a measure for which 
there was no data.  Data for each of these measures was included for both the home and 
host country for every dyad-year in the sample. 
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Incidentally, this list of controls is by no means exhaustive of the FDI literature.  
However, inclusion of the following variables was either impossible given the extent of 
publicly available data, or unwise given the systematic gaps in coverage for the counties 
included in this study.  These include the Profitability of FDI (which is, in itself, biased 
by MNE’s incentives to hide profits from their home country), Financial Risk 
(operationalized as the standard deviation of returns to FDI), FDI Inflow Controls, 
Business Cycles, and Military vs. Civilian Government.  Some authors have also 
included a measure for Political Risk.  For this purpose, Harms and others have used 
data taken from the PRS Groups’ International Country Risk Guide.  This proprietary 
data forecasts political risk and, as such, is an inappropriate metric for this study 
because it does not gauge the average investor’s perception of dyadic political risk. 
In order to test the second hypothesis (H2), that bilateral political affect and 
political ties have a greater influence on FDI inflows to autocratic states (as opposed to 
democratic ones), a mean-centered interaction term was formulated that includes a 
quantitative measure of host country political structures.  Polity IV scores, published by 
the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the 
University of Maryland, denote the range of autocracy to democracy on a [-10, +10] 
point scale for every host country in the sample.5  The country to receive the most 
autocratic score (-10) was Saudi Arabia.  Many Middle-Eastern countries followed 
closely with Kuwait (-9), United Arab Emirates (-8) and Morroco (-8).  Countries 
receiving scores in the middle of the democracy-autocracy scale include Mexico and 
Thailand.  The most democratic countries (those receiving a 10) include Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, Japan, Spain, and others.  The interaction term was constructed as 
follows: 
 
[Χ Dyad-year (VRA, GS) – µ Χ(VRA, GS)] * [(Host polity) Dyad-year – µ Host polity] 
 
The error covariance matrix of time series cross section data violates the 
standard assumptions of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions in that error terms 
are typically correlated across time within a cross-sectional value (i.e. autocorrelation) 
and across units at a moment in time (i.e. heteroskedacity).  While there are a range of 
                                                
5  -10 = complete autocracy; +10 = complete democracy. 
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alternatives to adjust for these conditions, Liang and Zenger highlight the benefits of a 
population-averaged data model (see also, McCullough, P. and J.A. Jelder, 
1989). Another approach championed by Beck and Katz (1995) is the use of panel-
corrected standard errors. We employ both of these methods both with and without 
country fixed effects. 
 
Predictions: 
 
In accordance with the findings of existing research, this study predicted that GDP per 
capita is a positive and significant determinant of FDI for both the home and host 
country.  When taken with the independent variables of home and host population (both 
of which were expected to be negatively correlated with inflows of FDI), GDP per 
capita approximates market size.  According to Jensen, a large economy in the host 
country implies that it can absorb large flows of foreign direct investment (Jensen 
2003); similarly, a large economy in the home country implies that there is sufficient 
capital to fund new and ongoing multinational investment projects. 
This study also predicted that host country human capital is a positive and 
significant determinant of FDI inflows, as (ceteris paribus) education and productivity 
are directly related vis-à-vis a given country’s workforce.  As such, it was expected that 
host country illiteracy rates are negatively correlated with inflows of FDI.  With regard 
to the home country, the prediction for human capital is less clear: on the one hand, 
greater human capital implies a more productive workforce and thus less incentive to 
seek investment opportunities abroad; and on the other, human capital is highly 
correlated with per capita GDP – a positive determinant of FDI flows.  The latter of 
these two effects is likely to predominate and, as such, this study predicted that, if 
significant, the coefficient for home country illiteracy would be negative as well.  While 
there are admittedly better proxies for human capital than literacy, the available data for 
net educational attainment was prohibitively sparse for the country and time sample of 
this study. 
Inflation rates were used as a proxy for the macroeconomic management of host 
and home countries.  With regard to the host country, it was predicted that inflation 
rates are negatively correlated with FDI, as higher levels of inflation generally imply 
macroeconomic mismanagement and thus increased financial risk to investment 
 14
projects.  To the extent that an abundance of natural resources can imply lower input 
prices and greater returns on investment, it was predicted that the measure for host 
country primary exports (as a percentage of total exports) is positively correlated with 
inflows of FDI.  With regard to the home country, primary exports were expected to be 
indirectly correlated with flows of FDI; indeed, ceteris paribus, greater natural 
resources imply that home input prices are lower relative to a potential host.  Finally, it 
was expected that the last control variable – trade as a percentage of GDP – is positively 
correlated with FDI. This is consistent with the findings of previous studies, which have 
used trade as a proxy for economic openness and FDI inflow controls (Harms 2001) – 
something for which there is little data. 
As mentioned previously, studies by Jensen, Harms, and others have 
independently shown that flows of FDI are attracted to states with democratic and 
transparent regimes.  As such, it was expected that inflows of FDI are positively 
correlated with host country Polity IV scores.  Indeed, the more democratic a regime, 
the greater the audience cost for mistreating MNEs, the less political risk to investment, 
and the more hospitable a country for FDI (Jensen, 2001). 
Finally, with regard the first hypothesis of this study (H1) – that bilateral affect 
and political ties are positive determinants of FDI flows within and between dyads – it 
was predicted that VRA-G Sum and Count are both positive and significant.  With 
regard to the second hypothesis (H2), that bilateral affect and political ties have a greater 
influence on inflows to autocratic states, it was predicted that the interaction term would 
be both negative and significant. 
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Results: 
 
Pursuant to the above data and methodology, there exists limited support for the first 
hypothesis of this study.  In the limited controls model the VRA-Goldstein Count 
variable appears to be robust across regression types and for both FDI inflows and 
netflows.  The Sum variable is less robust, with significance registering only in the 
population-averaged netflow model.6  The initial regressions included only controls for 
market size, but the relationship held when other controls were added as well.  The 
relationship also held in cases where net flow was used as the dependent variable.  The 
regressions that were conducted with lags and fixed effects yielded similar (though less 
robust) results. 
With regard to the first hypothesis, the fact that VRA-G Count was most 
significant implies that perhaps density of bilateral relations is more important than their 
type.  This would make sense if, for instance, it could be shown that a high number of 
events within a dyad implies intrinsic audience interests in each country, greater media 
coverage of the relationship, and thus greater accountability for foreign investors. 
The somewhat more limited support found with data lags implies that reverse 
causation may, in fact, be a problem.  This is consistent with the findings of recent 
studies, which have shown that FDI breeds cooperative relations (Polachek et. al., 
2004).  Further complication derives from the operational and decision lags of political 
risk-factored changes to foreign investment projects. 
Contrary to hypothesis H2, the mean-averaged interaction term is always 
positive when significant, with the clearest relationship being observed in the 
population-averaged and Prais-Winsten lagged models using VRA-Goldstein Count and 
FDI inflows.  With regard to the Count variable, this result indicates that density of 
bilateral relations does not positively affect inflows of FDI to autocratic countries in a 
manner that is disproportionately larger than to that of democratic countries. 
The regime type variable, Host Polity, is significant only in the Prais-Winsten 
lagged model using VRA-Goldstein Count and FDI inflows.  Though by no means 
                                                
6 Regressions using VRA-G Sum yielded less robust results, as the variable was only significant when net 
flows were used as the dependent variable.  While the explanation for this is unclear, one possible reason 
deals with the aggregation of summed scores (both positive and negative) vis-à-vis instances in which the 
home is the target and source of bilateral action.    
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robust, the coefficient of this variable has a sign that is inconsistent with recent 
literature, which has found that inflows of FDI are attracted to democratic and 
transparent regimes moreso than autocratic ones.  According to the regression, an 
increase in a country’s Polity IV score actually decreases inflows of FDI.  As expected, 
the coefficient of GDP per capita is positive when significant for both the home and 
host country.  Taken together with home and host country population, which is also 
positive when significant, this indicates that market size is a positive determinant of FDI 
inflows as they relates to capital abundance and FDI absorption, respectively.  Lagged 
inflows of FDI are also positive when significant. 
The above relationships were maintained when additional controls were added, 
though the coefficient on Host Polity was no longer significant in any model.  Home 
and Host Trade, the two measures for economic openness, were the most significant 
additional variables, with effects being observed in the inflow models of both VRA-
Goldstein Sum and Count.  None of the remaining independent variables not in the 
limited controls model had robust effects.  In addition, there were no systematic 
differences observed between control variables in the VRA-Goldstein Count versus Sum 
models. 
Though intuitively sound, either the hypothesis, design of the study (or both) is 
flawed.  In addition, with regard to the control variables in this study, including Polity 
IV scores for the host country, few coefficients were significant.  While the reason for 
this is unclear, the systematic gaps in data coverage for the time and country sample of 
this study was likely a factor.7 
 
                                                
7 The variables for home and host illiteracy were dropped altogether because they reduced the sample size 
by nearly an order or magnitude. 
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Flaws: 
 
Several potential flaws of this study deal with the VRA data itself.  Given that VRA only 
tracks events that appear in English-language newspapers, it is unclear to what extent this 
measure can be used to approximate investors’ perception of dyadic risk around the 
world.  However, this concern was mitigated by the fact that the above results were 
consistent with subsequent regressions that examined inflows from only the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and both.  Another potential flaw is that the limited time 
span for VRA’s publicly available data (ten years) makes it difficult to examine variation 
within dyads.  Finally, there is sometimes a significant lag between when an event occurs 
and when it is reported.  Ideally, the VRA/Goldstein measure should approximate the 
time at which international investors receive, and can reasonably incorporate into 
investment decisions, the information at hand; unfortunately, because reporting, decision, 
and operational lags vary widely, the event date was the most precise option available. 
What exacerbates each of these problems is that many psychological biases blur 
perceptions of risk.  Consider, for instance, the possibility for diminishing sensitivity to 
negative (or positive) events; logging the VRA-Goldstein Count measure was intended to 
partially correct for this, but it is unclear to what extent this action was appropriate or 
sufficient.  Also, consider the tendency for people to discount low probability but high 
impact events (Messick et. al., 1996), or the reality that investors are often use a biased 
subset of public discourse to make business decisions based upon dyadic risk.  Even if 
quantifiable, these effects could not easily be corrected for in future studies.  
There is also an issue with the event categories themselves.  While military 
engagements and economic aid within dyads are undeniably important to international 
investors, this study intended to examine bilateral affect and political ties as they relate to 
political risk to investment.  As such, the VRA data should have also included event 
categories for the renegotiation of contracts, nationalization of industries, and 
expropriation of investments.  Unfortunately, this was not possible given the publicly 
available data.  Finally, much like the VRA event categories, it is not clear that the 
normative weightings of the Goldstein scale reflect the true preferences and concerns of 
international investors.  There have been some efforts to revise the scale for this purpose, 
but unfortunately nothing was available as of this year. 
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Conclusions: 
 
What has motivated much of the recent literature on FDI is the question: Are the interests 
of MNEs conflictual with those of democratic governance?  A positive response to this 
could have profound implications for public policy and international development, but 
the consensus in recent literature is clear – inflows of FDI are attracted to states with 
democratic and transparent regimes.  While this study intended to qualify that finding by 
introducing a measure for bilateral affect and political ties – and thus political risk to 
investments – the consensus remains unchallenged.  However, this study demonstrated 
that a dyadic design for examining the non-market determinants of FDI is plausible, and 
that significant effects exist at that level of analysis.  The most robust new variable – a 
simple count of bilateral events between countries – should be further examined to 
uncover why the density of bilateral relations, both positive and negative, has the 
tendency to increase flows of FDI within dyads.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
\ 
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Appendix A 
 
FDI Home Country List: 
 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Canada 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany  
Greece 
Hungary  
Iceland  
Ireland  
Italy  
Japan  
Korea  
Mexico  
Netherlands  
New Zealand  
Norway  
Poland  
Portugal  
Slovak Republic  
Spain Sweden  
Switzerland  
Turkey  
United Kingdom  
United States 
 
 
FDI Host Country List: 
 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Chinese Taipei 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Egypt 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea 
 
 
Kuwait 
Libya 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Netherlands 
Netherlands Antilles 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Panama 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Republic Slovak 
Romania 
Russia 
Saudi Arabia 
Singapore 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Venezuela 
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Appendix B 
 
  Goldstein Scale and relevant VRA event categories: 
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